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Abstract: We study the relationship of risk aversion and debt maturity
structure. In a model in which adverse selection in financial markets
creates a role for the use of short-term debt, we allow the possibility of
borrowers being risk-averse. This creates a trade-off between reduced
expected financing costs and higher risk and allows for the study of the
effect of risk aversion on optimal maturity structure. We prove that, as
risk aversion increases, so does the percentage of debt that is long-term.
Keywords: risk aversion, debt maturity structure, adverse selection.
Resumen: En este artículo estudiamos la relación entre la aversión al
riesgo y la estructura de vencimiento de la deuda. En un modelo en que
la selección adversa en los mercados financieros ocasiona que la deuda
de corto plazo sea útil, permitimos que los deudores sean aversos al riesgo.
Esto crea una tensión entre la reducción de los costos financieros esperados
y el aumento en el riesgo, y permite que se analice el efecto de la aversión
al riesgo en la estructura óptima de vencimiento de la deuda. Probamos
que el porcentaje óptimo de deuda de largo plazo aumenta conforme se
incrementa la aversión al riesgo.
Palabras clave: aversión al riesgo, estructura de vencimiento de deuda,
selección adversa.
275 economía mexicana. NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XII, núm. 2, segundo semestre de 2003
*El Colegio de México, Camino al Ajusco 20, México, D. F.276
Introduction
T
he importance of understanding debt maturity structure has been
recently gaining recognition in the financial economics literature
and important progress has been made in its analysis. For instance,
Barclay and Smith (1995) emphasize the importance of this issue and
provide an empirical examination of the determinants of debt maturity
at the firm level. At the country level, recent experiences in Mexico
and other developing countries have caused the analysis of
international debt problems to move beyond the pure issue of debt
size to include more detailed aspects of the financing process including
the debt maturity profile.1 In this paper, we add to the literature on
debt maturity structure and focus on its relationship with one borrower
characteristic that has not hitherto received much attention in the
literature, namely, the borrower’s risk aversion.
In this paper, we rely on Flannery’s (1986) and Diamond’s (1991,
1993) view on why there is short-term debt. According to this view,
short-term debt can help alleviate adverse selection problems in
financial markets. To see why, consider a situation in which a firm has
better information than its lenders about the project it wants to
undertake. Usually, lenders will be able to observe the performance of
the firm and learn about it during the life of the project. This will
reduce the initial asymmetry of information. The role of short-term
debt arises precisely from this fact. Indeed, consider the choice of debt
maturity. The natural choice is for debt to mature at the same time at
which the project will render its fruits: to match the maturity of the
debt with the project it is going to finance. Apparently, a mismatch
between the maturity of the project and the debt issued to finance it
would only create risks. Yet, some advantages are obtained by financing
the project with debt that matures before the project is given time to
produce enough cash flows to repay it. The crucial point is simply that
lenders learn important information about the firm before enough time
has passed to allow for debt repayment. This implies that good
borrowers may be willing to borrow debt that matures before it can be
repaid out of the project’s cash flows because they know that at this
1 See for instance Cole and Kehoe (1996) for an analysis that emphasizes the importance of
debt maturity structure in the Mexican crisis. Cermeño, Hernández-Trillo and Villagómez (2001)
and Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) also deal with the role of public debt structure in the
1994-1995 crisis.
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time some new information will be known, showing that they are good.
This new information will, in turn, allow them to refinance their debt
at better terms.
The advantage of borrowing short-term has to be weighed, however,
against the risks it entails. Although good borrowers expect that new
information will most likely reveal that they have good projects, this
fact can by no means be taken for granted: to the extent that new
information will not completely eliminate the asymmetry of
information, there is a risk that future news will damage good
borrowers. Thus, short-term debt implies a higher risk than long-term
debt. In this paper, in contrast to Flannery and Diamond, we allow for
firms to be risk averse. This implies that the maturity choice has to
balance the benefits of refinancing at terms that allow for a better
assessment of the quality of the project against the costs of higher
risk. We find the maturity structure that optimally solves this trade-off.
Next, we are in a position to analyze the comparative statics of the
optimal debt contract. We prove a result that is intuitive: more risk
averse firms prefer to issue less short-term debt and more long-term
debt than less risk averse firms.
We then extend our analysis to show that our main result extends
to more complex settings. In particular, we consider a scenario where
there is a risk of a hike in market interest rates during the life of a
project, as in Fernández Ruiz (2002). This setting captures a situation
where different types of news arrive before the project matures, some
of which refer to the firm’s project itself while others do not.
From a formal point of view, our model is closest to Flannery (1986)
and Diamond (1991, 1993). Yet, there are important differences. First,
in the above papers, borrowers are risk neutral while here the firm is
risk averse. Second, and closely related to the previous difference, these
papers do not address the issue of the effect of risk aversion on debt
maturity structure, which is the focus of our paper. Third, while in
these papers there is only one kind of intermediate news, in ours, there
are news both about the firm’s project and a variable not directly related
to its project-market interest rates. Our paper is also related to
Fernández-Ruiz, who studies a model in which a risk averse country
finances its development project under asymmetric information, and
two types of news —one of which reduces the asymmetry of
information— become known before the project matures. But
Fernández-Ruiz focuses on the ability of debt contracts to accomplish
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the tasks performed by complete contracts. In contrast, in this paper
we focus on the role of risk aversion and its effect on debt maturity
structure.
I. The Model
In this section we present a model in the spirit of Flannery (1986) and
Diamond (1991, 1993). In this model a firm has to raise funds to
undertake a project, and has private information about the quality of
such a project. An important feature of this model is that during the
life of the project, before it matures, lenders receive news about some
project’s characteristics which help them reduce the initial asymmetry
of information.
A firm needs to raise an amount I to undertake a project. This
project will be developed over three periods, t = 0, 1, 2. At t = 0 the
firm can borrow the amount I in a competitive credit market if it can
provide nonnegative expected returns to lenders. At t = 1, information
about the firm’s project arrives. At t = 2 the project is completed and
produces cash flow. There are two types of projects, and the firm has
private information about the type of project it has. A firm with a good
project obtains an income of X > I, while a firm with a bad project
obtains X with probability p and 0 otherwise, with p X < I. Thus, under
symmetric information, lenders would not finance firms with bad
projects. Yet, lenders do not know if a firm has a bad project. At date 0,
they assign the firm a probability f of having a good project. Therefore,
they assign the firm a probability q = [ f + (1 – f ) p] of obtaining
date-two income equal to X.
By observing the performance of the firm, creditors learn something
about the firm’s project, which is reflected in the model in the following
way: at date t = 1 there are news about the project that reduce the
asymmetry of information between the firm and its creditors. These
news can be good, s = u (an upgrade of the firm’s rating takes place) or
bad, s = d (a downgrade takes place). Good firms receive bad news
with probability e, and bad firms with probability r, with e < r.
Creditors update their beliefs about the firm’s type upon observing
the realization of s. They do this by applying Bayes’ rule. Let f d ( f u )
be the updated probability —according to Bayes’ rule— that the firm
is good given bad (good) news. We have:
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We can calculate in a similar manner the conditional probability
that date-two income will be X given bad (good) news. Let us denote
these probabilities by qd ( qu ).
The firm maximizes its expected utility E [u(Y)], where Y is
date-two income, net of repayments to creditors, and u’( ) > 0, u” ()<0 .
Capital markets are competitive, and are willing to invest as long
as the expected discounted sum of net repayments from the firm equals
(or is higher than) 0.
II. Debt maturity structure
The firm can raise the funds to undertake the project by using any
combination of two different types of debt, short-term debt and
long-term debt, as in Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991, 1993). The
firm can issue short-term debt with nominal value S1 that matures at
t = 1, after interim news are released, and long-term debt with nominal
value D, that comes due after the project is completed at t = 2. To repay
S1, the firm needs to come back to the credit market, since at the time
S1 matures the project that has not yet produced any income. Thus,
we assume that at t = 1 the firm has access again to a competitive
credit market in which it can raise funds promising up to (X - D), that
is, the part of the resources that will not be needed to repay long-term
debt. Thus, at t = 1, the firm issues short-term debt with face value S2
that comes due at t = 2. We also assume that S1 and D are such that
the firm is always able to raise the necessary funds to repay S1 at
t = 1. We assume for the moment that the risk-free interest rate is
constant throughout the life of the project, and for simplicity we take
this interest rate to equal 0. In an extension of the model in the
following section we will consider the case in which this interest rate
may vary.
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Figure 1 illustrates the timing of the issuance and repayment of
the different types of debt.
Figure 1
Firm borrows IS 1 matures S2 matures
S1, D2 issued S2 issued D2 matures
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
We now need to establish several relationships between the
different types of debt. First, let us find how much debt the firm must
issue at date 1 to borrow the necessary funds to repay S1. This depends
on the arrival of good (s = u) or bad (s = d) news about the quality of
the project. To borrow S1 at t = 1, the firm must issue debt with face
value S2 satisfying:
S2 = S1 / qu if s = u, (3)
S2 = S1 / qd if s = d. (4)
To see why this is so, consider for instance the case s = u, (the
explanation for the other case is similar). Since there are good news
about the project (s = u), financial markets expect that it will yield X
with probability qu. This is the probability with which the firm will
repay the debt S2. Thus, the expected repayment from a debt with
face value S2 is qu S2, which must equal the amount borrowed S1.
The firm maximizes its expected utility E[u(Y)], where Y is date-two
income net of repayments to creditors, and capital markets are
competitive. As in Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991, 1993) we look
for the pooling equilibrium preferred by good quality firms. A good
quality firm chooses the amount of short-term debt S1 and long-term
debt D so as to solve the following program (we omit the subscript in
S1):
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The constraint of this program ensures that lenders will be willing
to lend the amount I. Its left-hand side is the repayment they expect
to receive from the firm: long-term debt with face value D will be repaid
at t = 2 with probability q = [ f +(1- f ) p ], because this is the
probability with which date-two cash flow will be X. Short-term debt
S1 will be repaid for sure at t = 1. This repayment has to be at least
equal to I for lenders to be willing to lend. Let us now look at the
objective function. It is the firm’s expected utility from its date-two
income X net of repayments to creditors. These repayments consist of
long-term debt with face value D, plus short-term debt with face value
S2. Consider the first term. With probability e there will be bad news
about the firm’s project (s = d). In this case, short-debt repayments
amount to S2 = S1 / qd, as determined by (4). The explanation for the
other term is similar.
We will consider the family of utility functions with a constant
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These utility functions are of the form
), exp( ) ( x b a x u q - + = q
where a higher q is associated with more risk aversion. Notice that
u’( ) > 0, u’’( ) < 0 imply b<0   and q >0 .
Let us assume, without any loss in generality, that a = 0 and
b =- 1, so that the firm chooses the debt structure (S1, D) that solves
the following program.
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As is shown in the appendix, the comparative statics of the solution
to program (1) lead to the following proposition:
Proposition 1. When the risk-free interest rate is constant along
the life of the project, an increase in the degree of risk aversion q
translates into an optimal financial contract comprising less short-term
debt S1 and more long-term debt D.
We illustrate this proposition by showing the optimal debt structure
for different degrees of risk aversion, when f = ½, e = ¼, r = ½, p = ½,
I = 1, and X = 2.
III. An extension: risk of change in interest rates
In this section we consider an extension of the above model that
considers the arrival of news not related to the project itself during
the life of the project, as in Fernández Ruiz (2002). More precisely,
there may be a hike in interest rates during the life of the project. So,
the model is modified as follows:
At t = 1, information about the firm’s project and about market
interest rates arrive. Thus, there are two types of news. First, as in
the previous section, there are news about the project that reduce the
asymmetry of information between the firm and its creditors. But now
there are also news about risk-free interest rates. They may remain
constant or increase: the one-period risk-free interest rate (that is, the
interest rate on a loan that will be repaid for sure) remains at 0 with
probability l, and increases to i > 0 with probability (1 – l).
The possibility of a hike in interest rates modifies the relationships
between the different types of debt. More precisely, the amount of debt
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Figure 2. Fraction of short-term debt as risk aversion varies when
i = 0
the firm must issue at date 1 to borrow the necessary funds to repay
S1 depends now not only on the arrival of good (s = u) or bad (s = d)
news about the quality of the project, but also on whether the interest
rate remains at 0 (n = c), or rises to i > 0 (n = h). To borrow S1 at t = 1,
the firm must issue debt with face value S2 satisfying:
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Table 1. Optimal values of short-term and long-term debt when i = 0
as risk aversion varies
  Theta Fraction of S S D
10.000 1.27E–01 0.1622 1.1171
4.000 3.38E–01 0.4055 0.7927
2.500 5.69E–01 0.6187 0.4683
2.000 7.63E–01 0.8109 0.2521
1.800 8.72E–01 0.9010 0.1320
1.650 9.77E–01 0.9829 0.0227
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S2 = S1 (1 + i) / qu if s = u, n = h, (5)
S2 = S1 / qu if s = u, n = c, (6)
S2 = S1 (1 + i) / qd if s = d, n = h, (7)
S2 = S1 / qd if s = d, n = c. (8)
To see why this is so, consider for instance the case s = u, n = h (the
explanation for the other cases is similar). Since there are good news
about the project (s = u), financial markets expect that it will yield X
with probability qu. This is the probability with which the firm will
repay the debt S2. Thus, the expected repayment from a debt with face
value  S2 is qu S2. Therefore, short-term debt S2 offers an expected
(gross) rate of return of qu S2 / S1, which must equal the (gross) interest
rate 1+ i, from where S2 = S1 (1 + i) / qu follows.
Given these relationships, we will look again for the contract
preferred by good quality firms among the pooling equilibrium
contracts. The amounts of short-term debt S1 and long-term debt D
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Let us interpret this program. As before, the constraint ensures
that lenders will be willing to lend the amount I and its left-hand side
is the repayment they expect to receive from the firm: long-term debt
with face value D will be repaid at t = 2 with probability q = [ f +(1- f )p],
because with this probability date-two cash flow will be X. Short-term
Jorge Fernández Ruiz y Blanca Cecilia García Medina285
debt S1 will be repaid for sure at t = 1, which explains the second term
in the left-hand side. The right-hand side is the opportunity cost of I.
With respect to the objective function, it is again a good firm’s
expected utility from its date-two income X net of repayments to
creditors. It has now four terms because there can be four different
combinations of date-one news. Let us interpret the first term. With
probability e(1 -l ) there will be bad news about the firm’s project
(s = d) and a hike in interest rates (n = h). In this case, short-debt
repayments amount to S2 = S1 (1 + i)/q d, as determined by (7). The
explanation for the other three terms is similar.
When using a utility function with constant absolute risk aversion,
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The comparative statics of the solution to program (2) lead (see
appendix) to the following proposition:
Proposition 2. When the risk-free interest rate may rise at t = 1,
an increase in the degree of risk aversion q translates into an optimal
financial contract comprising less short-term debt S1 and more
long-term debt D.
We illustrate this proposition using the same values as in the
example after proposition 1, plus l = ½ and i = ¼.
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Table 2. Optimal values of short-term (S) and long-term debt (D) when
i = = = = = ¼ as risk aversion varies
theta S/(S+D) S D
1000.10 3.64E–04 5.46E–04 1.50E+00
10.10 3.71E–02 5.46E–02 1.42E+00
4.01 9.51E–02 1.36E–01 1.30E+00
2.50 1.57E–01 2.19E–01 1.17E+00
1.50 2.76E–01 3.64E–01 9.54E–01
1.01 4.40E–01 5.41E–01 6.89E–01
0.90 5.07E–01 6.07E–01 5.90E–01
0.80 5.89E–01 6.83E–01 4.76E–01
0.70 7.03E–01 7.80E–01 3.29E–01
Figure 3 shows the proportion S /(S+D).
IV. Conclusions
We devote this section to summing up our main findings and to
comment on two issues not dealt with in our model that deserve
attention.
In this paper we have focused on the role of risk aversion on debt
maturity structure. We have drawn on the argument made by Flannery
(1986) and Diamond (1991, 1993) among others, that adverse selection
problems in financial markets can explain a divergence between debt
maturity and project maturity, to build a model amenable to study the
relationship between risk aversion and debt maturity structure.
The idea leading to the use of short-term debt in the basic model is
that good borrowers prefer short-term debt because it allows them to
refinance at a time when their performance has shown that they are
indeed good. This benefit of short-term debt has to be balanced against
the higher risk it creates. We have proved in this basic model the
intuitive result that as risk aversion increases so does the proportion
of total debt that is long-term.
We have extended the basic model to allow for uncertainty in
variables not directly related to the project to be financed. Thus, we
have considered a situation in which during the life of a project there
are two kind of news. One of these news reduces the asymmetry of
information between the borrower and the lender. The other one does
not directly relate to the project. We have taken this second variable
to be the one-period risk-free interest rate. We have found that in this
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Figure 3. Short-term debt as a fraction of total debt as risk aversion
varies when i = ¼
extended setting our previous result continues to hold: More risk averse
borrowers find it optimal to contract a higher proportion of long-term
debt.
We now deal with two issues not addressed in the model that
deserve some comment. The first one calls for an extension of the model
that is best understood by considering a situation where the
intermediate signal is so bad that both the firm and its lenders know
that the project is useless. To deal with this issue, we could extend the
model to allow for liquidation. In other words, to allow for the project
to be canceled before it matures. Although cancellation of the project
before its maturity would come at a cost —a partial loss of the initial
investment— it would avoid a worst-case scenario. This has
implications for the optimal debt maturity structure, since firm’s
liabilities should be designed to make efficient use of future information
and this may imply setting the firm’s liabilities so as to make possible
canceling the project if the news are sufficiently bad. When comparing
the advantages and disadvantages of short-term versus long-term debt,
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it should be noticed that the first one is better equipped to deal with
these situations, since it forces the firm to come back to the capital
markets before the projects mature. If these markets’ assessment of
the quality of the project is negative, the firm will be unable to refinance
its debt. This, in turn, will force the firm to liquidate its project and
will allow investors to recover some of their initial investment. On the
other hand, by using short-term debt we will face the risk of inefficiently
liquidating the project. Summing up, adding this extra dimension
would both make the model more difficult and enrich the analysis.
The second comment has to do with liquidity issues. The structure
of the model does not consider them and one could think of at least
two ways in which they could be added. First, there is no liquidity
premium present in the equations that describe the relationship
between long-term and short-term interest rates. Second, the firm does
not face the possibility of a liquidity shock at any point during the life
of the project. They are simplifying assumptions that make the model
more tractable.
These two issues deserve attention. Yet, by abstracting from them
we have been able to isolate one important channel through which
risk aversion affects the optimal debt maturity structure.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
It is a particular case of proposition 2, when i = 0.
Proof of Proposition 2
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Notice first that the constraint holds with equality, otherwise we
could decrease either S or D, increase the objective function and still
satisfy this constraint. Thus, we have that
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Since this second derivative is negative (each of its four terms is
negative), the following first-order condition characterizes an interior
maximum:
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¶ S S  < 0, which proves the proposition.
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